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Single Idea 7388

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism ]

Full Idea

McGinn invites his readers to join him in surrender: It's just impossible to imagine how software could make a conscious robot. Don't even try, he says. Other philosophical experiments (involving China) "work" by dissuading readers from imagining.

Gist of Idea

McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines

Source

comment on Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Consciousness Explained' [Penguin 1993], p.435

A Reaction

I agree with Dennett. If you don't try to imagine how robots might do it, you are also denied the right to try to imagine how brains might manage it. Admittedly this is hard, but good imagination needs study, effort, discussion, time, information...

The 74 ideas from Colin McGinn

6042 The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn]
6053 Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]
6051 In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn]
6055 Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn]
6059 Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn]
6052 Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn]
6043 Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
6044 Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
6046 Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
6050 Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
6049 Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
6058 Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
6054 Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
6045 It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
6047 All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn]
6048 Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
6062 Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
6065 We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
6067 Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]
6069 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn]
6068 We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn]
6071 Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn]
6066 Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
6072 If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn]
6073 I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn]
6064 Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn]
6070 Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
6075 Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
6074 Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn]
6077 Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
6082 If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
6081 Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn]
6080 Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn]
6079 If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn]
6088 Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn]
6083 The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn]
6084 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
6085 The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
6086 Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
6087 Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
4690 If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]
4691 If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
2543 Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
2544 Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn]
2545 Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
2546 Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn]
2547 There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn]
2539 Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn]
2540 Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
2542 Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn]
12019 McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn]
18892 Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn]
7388 McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
3185 Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
6171 Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn]
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]